Recently, the security scheme, proposed by Kempf and Koodli, has been adopted as a security standard for Fast handover for Mobile IPv6. But, it does not prevent denial of service attacks while resulting in high computation cost. More importantly, we find that it is still vulnerable to redirection attacks because it fails to secure the Unsolicited Neighbor Advertisement messages. In this paper, Kempf-Koodli's scheme is formally analyzed through BAN-logic and its weaknesses are demonstrated.
Introduction
By exploiting various L2 triggers, Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) addresses the excessive latency caused during the mobile node's handover [1] . Without any security mechanism, it is susceptible to various security threats such as redirection attacks. Several approaches have been conducted to protect FMIPv6 [2] - [5] . They attempt to securely distribute a handover key between a mobile node and an access router by relying on the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol [6] or the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure [7] . Among them, the security scheme of Kempf and Koodli has been adopted as a standard (RFC 5269) [2] . It achieves the most secure handover key distribution by depending upon the SEND protocol which based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method [8] . However, the SEND protocol causes the scheme to suffer from denial of service attacks and high computation cost. More importantly, we discover that it is still vulnerable to redirection attacks since it does not protect the Unsolicited Neighbor Advertisement (UNA) message. In this paper, we show Kempf-Koodli's scheme is not correct through BAN-logic [9] , which is widely used for the formal analysis of security protocols, and then demonstrate its weaknesses. It is assumed that each entity has a public/private key pair (PU MN /PR MN or PU AR(i) /PR AR(i) ) and its address is a CGA. It is also assumed that each mobile node possesses a handover encryption public/private key pair (HEPK MN / HERK MN ), which is generated using the same public key algorithm as for the SEND protocol. Note that the key pair should be used for only handover negotiation. Moreover, we assume that there is a secure channel between access routers. Figure 1 shows Kempf-Koodli's scheme, which is composed of three phases: handover key negotiation, fast binding update and new network attachment phases.
Review of Kempf-Koodli's Scheme

Operation
In order to protect FMIPv6, the scheme adopts the SEND protocol, which is based on the CGA method. Through the CGA method, the MN and the AR(i) can verity that each other's address and public key are valid, thus safely utilizing public key cryptography to protect signaling messages as well as negotiate a handover key with each other.
(1) Handover key negotiation phase: During this phase, the MN negotiates a handover key with the current access router AR(i) through its handover encryption public key 
Formal Verification
In this section, we use BAN-logic to verify the correctness of Kempf-Koodli's scheme. BAN-logic was introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in 1989 [9] . Since then, due to simplicity and robustness, it has become the best-known and most influential method for formally analyzing and verifying security protocols. In BAN-logic, the verification of a protocol is typically performed as follows: (i) idealize the original protocol, (ii) define assumptions about the initial state and (iii) apply logical postulates repeatedly until getting the intended results. For details on notations and logical postulates of BAN-logic, refer to [9] . In order to verify Kempf-Koodli's scheme, we first make two definitions as shown in Fig. 2 . It is clear from the meaning of the definitions that they are intuitively true. The idealized form of Kempf-Koodli's scheme is described in Fig. 3 . In the form, the HMAC(K, M) operation is expressed as < M > K . Especially, because the MN can send the AR(i) the valid FBU message only if it knows HK(i), the second part is included in the FBU message of the idealized form. The assumptions are defined in Fig. 4 . While A5-A7 and A13 are about the freshness of the nonces and the authority on the messages, other assumptions are about the shared handover key and the private key/public key pairs. Strictly speaking, in BAN-logic, we cannot prove that PU MN belongs to the MN as well as PU AR(i) belongs to the AR(i) though they can be verified by the CGA method. Thus, we present A4 and A10 instead. With the idealized form, definitions and assumptions, we can verify Kempf-Koodli's scheme as described in Fig. 5 . First, the verification focuses on checking if the handover key negotiation is correct during steps (1)- (5) . After that, the FBU and FBA messages are validated during steps (6)- (9) . In (9), because the FBA message includes seq, the MN can believe that this message is fresh and consequently true. From (8), we can know that the AR(i) believes the FBU message. Based on such belief, it acts as a temporary home agent while redirecting the MN's traffic to the AR(i+1). However, because the AR(i+1) just sees the UNA message, it is not sure that the MN truly arrives at its link. The unbelievable UNA message causes the scheme to be vulnerable to several attacks. As a result, we can conclude that the scheme is not correct.
Weaknesses of Kempf-Koodli's Scheme
As shown above, Kempf-Koodli's scheme does not protect the UNA message while focusing on only securing the handover negotiation phase. Moreover, it suffers from high computation cost and denial of service attacks. In this section, we analyze such weaknesses of the scheme in detail.
Insecure UNA Messages
With insecure UNA messages, an attacker can launch the following redirection attacks.
• Session hijacking attacks based on eavesdropping: It is assumed that the attacker can eavesdrop all traffic between the victim MN and the AR(i), and thus know the MN's handover context. If the attacker captures the FBU message from the MN, it tries to attach the link of the AR(i + 1) with the MN's CoA(i + 1) and then send the fabricated UNA message to that router faster than the MN. If such a trial is successful, the AR(i + 1) cannot detect if the UNA message is forged. As a result, it starts to forward the traffic sent to the MN to the attacker.
• Session hijacking attacks based on the stolen handover key: It is assumed that the attacker somehow succeeds in stealing the victim MN's current handover key HK(i). In this case, the attacker can easily make use of the reactive mode in order to launch the session hijacking attack. Note that if the predictive mode is used, the victim node can detect that the other node tries to masquerade itself by receiving the unexpected FBA message. After the attacker moves to another link, it sends that link's access router AR(i + 1) the UNA message including the fabricated FBU message, whose authenticator is generated with the stolen handover key. After processing the UNA message, the AR(i + 1) performs the fast binding update phase with the MN's current access router AR(i). As a result, the traffic toward the MN is redirected to the attacker.
• Malicious flooding attacks: The purpose of this attack is to cause the target network to be flooded with unwanted excess traffic. This attack is executed by two attackers: Attacker1 and Attacker2. It is assumed that two attackers can communicate with each other. While the Attacker1 is a legitimate mobile node and initiates the attack, the Attacker2 exists in the target network and sends a forged UNA message to let this attack continued. In order to initiate this attack, the Attacker1 first makes sessions with corresponding nodes, which can result in excess traffics. Then, it sends an FBU message indicating that it will move to the target network. Note that at this point the AR(i) starts to tunnel the Attacker1's traffic to the target network's access router AR(i + 1). The lifetime or the buffer size for the established tunnel is limited until the AR(i + 1) receives the Attacker1's UNA message. Instead of handover, the Attacker1 just requests the Attacker2 to send an UNA message indicating that the Attacker1 attaches the target network. The Attacker2 transmits the requested message to the AR(i+1), which then release the limitation on the tunnel established for the Attacker1. As a result, the Attacker1's traffic is redirected to the target network.
High Computation Cost
As shown in Table 1 , the MN and the AR(i) should perform at least three asymmetric cryptographic operations. Such a computation overhead imposes considerable burdens on mobile nodes, which generally tend to have limited computational capabilities and low battery power.
Denial of Service Attacks
Because of being protected by the SEND protocol, the digitally signed RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages cause the AR(i) to be vulnerable to the denial of service (DoS) attack. In addition, because more than one CGA can be derived from one public key, one attacker is able to masquerade as many MNs. Especially, if the AR(i) accepts that the S ec value is 0, the attacker can easily and efficiently generate CGAs by using just one public/private key pair. Even more, she or he can perform the DoS attack while making CGAs in real time. The attacker launches the DoS attack as below:
(a) Generates a private/public key pair.
(b) Derives N CGAs from the public key. (c) Uses the private key and the generated CGAs to make, sign and send N RtSolPr messages.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the weaknesses of Kempf-Koodli's scheme. The formal verification, based on BAN-logic, showed that it is not correct due to insecure UNA messages. Especially, it was demonstrated that this drawback causes the scheme to be still vulnerable to several redirection attacks. In addition, we analyzed the scheme's computational cost and how to launch the DoS attack.
